Attorney Matthew Lawrence Guadagno's Legal Cases

Immigration

Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Jobson's removal proceedings were terminated.

Mr. Jobson was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree under NY law. Mr. Jobson was ordered removed by the Board of Immigration Appeals because he was deemed removable as someone convicted of a ... crime of violence. I was able to convince the Second Circuit that his conviction for manslaughter in the second degree was not a crime of violence. The Second Circuit utilizes the “categorical approach” for determining if an offense is a crime of violence. Under the categorical approach, the court does not look at the facts of the case, but instead, looks to see if the offense can be committed without using violence. Since manslaughter in the second degree can be committed by an act of omission or the failure to act, it is not an offense that is violent by nature. As a result, Mr. Jobson’s removal proceedings against him were terminated. This case was so important that the Immigrant Defense Project submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Second Circuit.

Immigration

Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Khouzam was not deported.

As a result of this decision, Mr. Khouzam was not returned to Egpyt where he had been tortured. This case is often cited in cases about the Convention Against Torture. The Second Circuit rejected a f ... inding by the Board of Immigration Appeals that torture committed by police officers to obtain a confession is not protected by the Convention Against Torture. The Second Circuit was critical of the Board of Immigration Appeals for requiring that applicants under the Convention Against Torture show that government officials have actual knowledge that the applicant will be tortured. The Second Circuit held that under the regulations, it is enough that the government officials are aware that their police engage in torture and “acquiesce” in their conduct.

Immigration

Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Restrepo's case was remanded to District Court.

This case was the first of three cases that I litigated involving whether a waiver pursuant to INA § 212(c) is available to individuals who were convicted by trial before the repeal of 212(c) relief. ... This case was the first decision by any Court of Appeals to hold that a permanent resident convicted by jury trial before the repeal of 212(c) relief could possibly be eligible for 212(c) relief. In INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court held that permanent residents convicted by plea agreement before the repeal of 212(c) relief continue to be eligible for that form of relief. The Supreme Court’s decision did not address individuals who were convicted by jury trial. Before Restrepo every Court of Appeals to have addressed the issue concluded that 212(c) relief was not available to permanent residents that were convicted by jury trial prior to the repeal of 212(c).

Immigration

Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2004)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Zalawadia was eligible for relief from removal.

The Fifth Circuit denied Mr. Zalawadia’s request for a stay of deportation and he was deported while his petition for review was pending. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, ... 533 U.S. 289 (2001), Mr. Zalawadia’s deportation order was no longer valid, however, he had been deported while his case was pending. This case was the first Court of Appeals decision to hold that a non-citizen that is deported while his petition for review is pending can continue to fight their case from abroad. As a result of this decision, Mr. Zalawadia was permitted to return to the United States and he was eventually granted a waiver by an immigration judge.

Immigration

Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005)

N/A

OUTCOME: The Government's motion to dismiss was denied.

I filed a petition for review for Mr. Sepulveda and the Government filed a motion to dismiss that argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Sepulveda’s claims. Not every case that is de ... nied by the Board of Immigration Appeals can be brought as a petition for review. One of the kinds of immigration cases that the Court of Appeals cannot consider are discretionary decisions by the Board. The Government claimed that Mr. Sepulveda’s challenge to the denial of his motion to reopen was barred because he was seeking adjustment of status, which is a discretionary form of relief. The Second Circuit did not dismiss the case because I argued that Mr. Sepulveda’s arguments on appeal would be based upon a legal issue and not a challenge to a discretionary decision by the Board.

Criminal defense

United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2006)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Lopez's case was remanded to District Court.

This is a criminal case that involved a conviction for reentry after deportation. The Second Circuit held that the District Court erred in denying Mr. Lopez’s motion to dismiss. I won Mr. Lopez’s app ... eal by arguing that his motion to dismiss should not have been denied without first providing him with a hearing on whether or not he would have won in immigration court, if he had been permitted to apply for a form of relief called 212(c).

Immigration

Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2006)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Wilson's case was remanded to the Immigration Court.

This case was the second of three cases that I litigated involving whether a waiver pursuant to INA § 212(c) is available to individuals who were convicted by trial before the repeal of 212(c) relief. ... I won Mr. Wilson a hearing before an Immigration Judge on whether he is eligible for 212(c) relief. The Second Circuit held that for lawful permanent residents that went to trial before AEDPA amended 212(c) to be eligible for 212(c) relief, they must be able to show that they were aware that they could have applied for 212(c) relief directly with the former INS before 212(c) relief was repealed, but decided to delay filing the application until they were placed in deportation proceedings.

Immigration

Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Blake's case was remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

I represented two out of the four petitioners that the Second Circuit addressed in its decision. Both of my clients prevailed and were granted hearings on their applications for 212(c) relief before a ... n immigration judge. Both Mr. Blake and Mr. Chong eventually received 212(c) relief from an immigration judge. This is an important case because the Second Circuit overturned the Board of Immigration Appeals’ precedent decisions in Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 2005), and Matter of Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA 2005). The Second Circuit was the first court to reject the Board’s decisions in Blake and Brieva. Prior to this decision, the First, Seventh, and Ninth circuits had all upheld Matter of Blake and Matter of Brieva. It is unusual for one Court of Appeals to render a decision that goes against the decision of another Court of Appeals. It is even more remarkable that the Second Circuit rendered a decision that went against three other circuits.

Immigration

Walcott v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Walcott's case was remanded to the Immigration Court.

This case was the last of three cases that I litigated involving whether a waiver pursuant to INA § 212(c) is available to individuals who were convicted by trial before the repeal of 212(c) relief. I ... n 2001, the Supreme Court rendered a decision, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 US 289 (2001), where the Supreme Court held that 212(c) relief remains available to individuals that pleaded guilty before the repeal of 212(c). However, the Supreme Court did not address what would happen to individuals who went to trial. In cases that I had previously won, Restrepo and Wilson, the Second Circuit held that it could be possible for someone who went to trial before the repeal of 212(c) to still be eligible for 212(c) relief. The Government argued that Mr. Walcott’s case was different from Restrepo and Wilson because Walcott’s conviction was on appeal when 212(c) was repealed. I won Mr. Walcott a hearing before an immigration judge on whether he is eligible for 212(c) relief.

Immigration

Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2008)

N/A

OUTCOME: Mr. Martinez's case was remanded to the Immigration Court.

Mr. Martinez was found to be ineligible for relief from removal because his misdemeanor convictions for sale of marijuana were classified as an aggravated felony conviction. The Board of Immigration A ... ppeals treated Mr. Martinez’s very minor convictions as being very serious. Someone who is convicted of offense that is classified as an aggravated felony is only eligible for relief in very limited circumstances. Because this case was so important, the Immigrant Defense Project and NYU Law School Clinic filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Mr. Martinez. We convinced the court that Mr. Martinez’s misdemeanor convictions should not be treated as an aggravated felony. As a result, Mr. Martinez was granted a hearing before an immigration judge where he was permitted to apply for a form of relief from removal called cancellation of removal.

Matthew Lawrence Guadagno's Legal Cases (12)

Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2003)

Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004)

Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004)

Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2004)

Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005)

United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2006)

Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2006)

Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007)

Walcott v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008)

Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2008)