Providence, RI
Workers compensation Lawyer at Providence, RI
Practice Areas: Workers Compensation, Wrongful Death, Personal Injury
OUTCOME: Successful
Represented plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that her neighbors, the defendants, erected a line of arborvitae trees that blocked her water view in violation of Rhode Island's spite fence statute. After w ... eek long trial, a judge of the Providence Superior Court found in plaintiff's favor, and ordered certain of the trees removed or cut.
OUTCOME: Upheld in part and remanded in part.
Represented the Defendant, Narrow River Kayaks, LLC. The plaintiff was unsuccessful in winning a town concession contract to operate a paddle sports business on town-owned land . Narrow River was the ... current occupant of that property and a bidder for the concession. Arguing that it was wrongly denied the award, the plaintiff’s complaint asked for (1) a declaratory judgment that the town had violated sections of the general laws controlling the award of municipal contracts, G.L. 1956 chapter 55 of title 45, and (2) injunctive relief against the town to prevent it from rebidding the concession contract. The town conducted an advertised bidding process that asked for paddle sports businesses to bid and specify the amount they would be willing to pay to the town annually to operate on the property. After reviewing the two bids received, the town’s purchasing agent concluded that Kayak Centre was the most qualified bidder and recommended that the town council award it the concession contract. However, at the subsequent town council meeting, when a motion was made to award the contract to Kayak Centre, the town council voted three to one to reject the motion. The town council then voted three to one to reject all bids and commence the bidding process again, to reformulate a bid package that would better ascertain which bidder was in the best interest of the town. On appeal, the plaintiff maintained that the trial justice made two errors that warrant reversal: (1) it was error to fail to apply § 45-55-5 and deny declaratory relief, and (2) it was error for the trial justice to deny injunctive relief because she concluded that the standards of fairness outlined in our prior cases did not apply to this particular dispute. Defendant argued the statute did not apply. On review, the Supreme Court saw no error in the trial justice’s ruling that § 45-55-5 did not apply to the situation because the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The Court held that § 45-55-5, as written, applies to the “purchases” of a municipal entity, not a concession agreement that generates revenue. However, the Court held that the good faith standard of Gilbane Building Co. v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 107 R.I. 295, 299-300, 267 A.2d 396, 399 (1970), applied in the absence of a specific statute. Because the trial justice concluded that the Gilbane standard did not apply, she consequently did not address whether the town acted “corruptly or in bad faith, or so unreasonably or so arbitrarily as to be guilty of a palpable abuse of discretion.” Gilbane, 107 R.I. at 399, 267 A.2d at 300 (citing Slocum v. City of Medford, 18 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Mass. 1939)). Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial justice’s determination as to the applicability of the Gilbane standard, the case was remanded to the trial justice for findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue.
OUTCOME: Successful
Represnted the plaintiff. Plaintiffs Warwick Sewer Authority and the City of Warwick (city), brought a lawsuit concerning the city’s ownership of real property, and a hearing justice granted the plain ... tiffs summary judgment on that complaint. The defendant appealed, contending that when he dedicated the property at issue to the city in 1979, he did so subject to it being used exclusively as open space. He argued that he maintained a reversionary interest in the property, and that, therefore, genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the hearing justice from granting summary judgment. The defendant further asserted that the Superior Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs because no actual justiciable controversy existed in this case. The Supreme Court first held that this case was justiciable because the plaintiffs had standing to bring their declaratory judgment action and, in so doing, they had presented sufficient facts giving rise to some conceivable legal hypothesis that would entitle them to some relief against the defendant. On the merits, the Court stated that the plat map that the defendant had filed with the city upon his dedication sufficiently and unambiguously evidenced his intent to make an unconditional dedication of the subject property, without any limitations or restrictions. The Court noted that acceptance by the public—the second element required to effectuate a dedication—was met when the city accepted the defendant’s dedication by noting it on a plat card that was signed by the chair of the planning board and recorded by a deputy city clerk. The Supreme Court further reasoned that because the plat map and the plat card—the only two documents evidencing the defendant’s dedication—were unambiguous on their face, parol evidence was not admissible to vary the terms of those documents. Ultimately, the Court held that no genuine issue of material fact existed and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
OUTCOME: Successful
Represented plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought a complaint against defendants, their neighbors and abutting landowners over defendants installation of nineteen large 25-40 foot eastern red cedar trees alo ... ng the mutual property line, which obstructed the plaintiffs water view. After a 4-day trial in Newport County Superior Court, a judge found the plaintiffs had proven the elements of "spite fence" under RI law, and ordered certain of the trees removed so as to restore plaintiff's view.
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