New York, NY
Criminal defense Lawyer at New York, NY
Practice Areas: Criminal Defense, Litigation
OUTCOME: Change of Venue Granted
Ten Long Island businessmen were charged in federal court in the Southern District of Florida with operating a business opportunity fraud. Our firm moved for a change of venue under Fed.R.Crim.P. 21 ( ... b) from Florida to New York, where most of the government's alleged fraud occurred and where most of witnesses and defendants lived.
OUTCOME: counsel sucessfully removed all restraint against Claimant's property by demonstrating claimant was an innocent owner of the home, despite the fact that it was bought with money advance by convicted husband.
Government obtained criminal forfeiture against assets, including overseas accounts, insurance policies and Miami home of alleged money launderer.
OUTCOME: Vacated and Remanded
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed civil suit against defendant for securities violations. Following sentencing in related criminal prosecution wherein defendant was convicted on obstructio ... n of justice charges, 854 F.Supp. 975, SEC moved for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds based on findings of fact rendered by court at sentencing proceeding. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Sand, J., 983 F.Supp. 442, granted summary judgment for SEC and permanently enjoined defendant from future securities violations. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, McLaughlin, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) application of offensive collateral estoppel to sentencing findings, in subsequent civil proceeding, is not per se prohibited, but precluding relitigation on basis of such findings should be presumed improper, and (2) application of collateral estoppel to preclude defendant from relitigating his liability for securities fraud, based on prior sentencing findings, was improper. Vacated and remanded.
OUTCOME: Amended Judgment imposing forfeiture vacated
Martin Seltzer pled guilty to participating in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a) and 1963, and conspiracy to impede the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ... § 371. In open court on February 9, 1999, the district court sentenced Seltzer to 16 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release and imposed a special assessment of $100, a fine of $10,000, and restitution in the total amount of $314,000. The written judgment was entered on February 17, 1999. On March 1, 1999, the government submitted a proposed forfeiture order to the district court. Seltzer objected to the proposed order, arguing that the restitution imposed at sentencing was in lieu of forfeiture. At oral argument on the issue, the district court stated that the proposed order reflected the court's intention at sentencing. The amended judgment entered on March 30, 1999 was identical to the February 17, 1999 judgment except for the addition of a $150,000 forfeiture, and the imposition of joint and several liability for a forfeiture of $350,000. On appeal, Seltzer argued that the amended judgment unlawfully increased his sentence. The government agrees. However, the parties dispute whether the initial sentence should stand, as Seltzer argues, or whether Seltzer's entire sentence should be vacated, and his case remanded for resentencing de novo, as the government argues. The government's position is essentially an appeal of the district court's original sentence. The government argues that Seltzer was fully aware that his plea to racketeering activities required him to pay a forfeiture, and the district court intended to impose forfeiture but neglected to do so. However, the government did not appeal the district court's initial sentence, despite ample time to do so. Instead, the government asked the district court to amend its judgment in a manner that is not permitted by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as the government now concedes. Because “[t]his court may only review a judgment that is ‘lawfully brought before it for review,’ ” we lack jurisdiction over Seltzer's original sentence. United States v. Whaley, 148 F.3d 205, 207 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we hereby VACATE the district court's March 30, 1999 amended judgment without disturbing the final judgment entered on February 17, 1999.
OUTCOME: Severance Granted on Defense Motion
Defendant charged with conspiracy to distribute over 50 kilograms of heroin filed motion to sever himself from other defendants named in indictment. The Supreme Court, Kings County, Rappaport, J., held ... that: (1) conspiracy count against defendant could not be joined with conspiracy count against seven codefendants on grounds conspiracies were part of common scheme or plan; and (2) conspiracy counts could not be joined on grounds conspiracies were part of the same criminal transaction. Defendant thereafter accepted a plea offer of two years while his codefendants received sentences of 50-life.
OUTCOME: Murder conviction reversed/remanded for new trial
Gonzalez was convicted in the Circuit Court, Dade County, David M. Gersten, J., of second-degree murder, and he appealed. The District Court of Appeal held that trial court's failure to conduct adequa ... te voir dire about juror's bias toward insanity defense in second-degree murder trial denied defendant a fair trial by impartial jury. Counsel sucessfully argued that the trial court failed to make adequate inquiry of the jury after it was reported by an alternate juror that another juror described the insanity defense as a “cop-out.”