Michael Tracy v. Glazer's, Inc.
May 12, 2015OUTCOME: We prevailed on behalf of the employer and insurer at all levels.
The employee sustained an alleged accident and alleged injury arising out of and in the course of his alleged employment in St. Louis, Missouri on 02/20/2009. Employer furnished medical aid until deem ... ed at maximum medical improvement by the authorized provider and paid no temporary total disability benefits. The Report of Injury was timely so the applicable statute of limitation was 2 years from the date of accident or last payment on account of the injury. The last payment by the insurer was 06/13/2009. The initial Claim was not filed until 01/30/2012 or 2 years, 7 months, and 20 days later. Statute of limitations was raised as an affirmative defense. The applicable statute is §287.430. The language in question was “no proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury…., or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury….” Employee sought and paid for unauthorized treatment within 2 years of filing the claim. Employee’s attorney argued that the statute does not specify payment by the employer/insurer and believed “strict construction” under Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) allows for ANY payment by ANY party. In Robinson, the court stated that the current version of the Act specifies that reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of chapter 287 strictly.‖ See §287.800.1. Strict construction means that a statute can be given no broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms. The operation of the statute must be confined to matters affirmatively pointed out by its terms, and to cases which fall fairly within its letter. A strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed. Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). On behalf of the employer and insurer, we argued that strict construction cut both ways and that claimant’s interpretation gave significantly broader application than was warranted and would totally gut the statute of limitations provision. We believed “last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury” language contemplated only payments required of the employer/insurer in §287.140. The case was tried on 03/20/2014 before ALJ Linda Wenman in St. Louis. Judge Wenman denied the claim based on the statute of limitations. The employee appealed to the Labor & Industrial Relations Commission. The Commission affirmed the denial. Both Judge Wenman and the Commission relied on the “last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury” interpretation offered above. The Commission, in particular, relied on a Western District Court of Appeals case cited in our brief to the Commission which was virtually on point. The employee’s attorney appealed to the Eastern District Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the original Award and Commission’s decision denying compensation because the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals was not interested in the claimant’s novel theory and issued a per curiam decision with all the judges concurring with the decision on 05/12/2015.
