Melbourne, FL
Employment and labor Lawyer at Melbourne, FL
Practice Areas: Employment & Labor, General Practice, Business
OUTCOME: Motion for Summary Judgment Denied
Plaintiff sued his former employer alleging that Defendant breached his employment agreement and failed to pay him minimum wage and overtime in violation of the FLSA. Defendants moved for summary judgm ... ent arguing that Plaintiff was an independent contractor and not an "employee" covered by the FLSA.
OUTCOME: Motion to Dismiss Denied
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's individual and collective action claims, arguing that their Rule 68 offer of judgment—unaccepted by Plaintiff—fully compensates him and moots his claim as well a ... s the collective action.
OUTCOME: Motion to Dismiss Denied
Federal Court held that discrimination based on pregnancy is an “unlawful employment practice” under the Florida Civil Rights Act. This decision noted that there is a split in authority in the ... Florida District Courts of Appeals on the issue of whether pregnancy discrimination claims are cognizable under the FCRA. The court went through each of the District Courts of Appeals decisions on the issue and concluded that "... Florida's District Courts of Appeal are in disagreement concerning the issue at hand, and no overwhelming authority can be discerned among the few Florida District Court decisions on point." Under such circumstances, the Court must predict how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve the disagreement.** The court went on to conduct a statutory and legislative history analysis of the FCRA with regard to unlawful employment practices and concluded that the Florida Supreme Court would agree that discrimination based on pregnancy is an "unlawful employment practice" under the FCRA. The court notes that the focus on reproductive functions as a means of defining “sex” supports the notion that Florida legislators would have understood “sex” to include pregnancy as a function unique to the female sex. Accordingly, a plain reading of the phrase “to discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex” should be understood to ban discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s” reproductive functions (e.g., pregnancy). ______________________________________________________________________________ *On November 7, 2013 the Florida Supreme Court heard arguments in the matter of Delva v. The Continental Group, Inc. (SC12-2315) regarding the issue of whether the Florida Civil Rights Act prohibits pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination wherein Petitioner directed the Court to review the analysis set forth in Glass v. Captain Katanna's, Inc. in order to reach the correct conclusion. ______________________________________________________________________________ ** On April 17, 2014, The Supreme Court issued its order and held that the FCRA does protect against pregnancy discrimination, reasoning; "... the capacity to become pregnant is one of the most significant and obvious distinctions between the female and male sexes. For this reason, discrimination based on pregnancy is in fact discrimination based on sex because it is discrimination as to a natural condition unique to only one sex and that arises "because of [an] individual's . . . sex.' § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat. "
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