Olympia, WA
Estate planning Lawyer at Olympia, WA
Practice Areas: Estate Planning, Elder Law
OUTCOME: Supreme Court upheld Court of Appeals' rejection of Bruch's challenge.
Defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that the court-imposed term of community custody is indeterminate and may exceed the statutory requirement of three years of community custody required under ... RCW 9.94A.701(1).
OUTCOME: Court of Appeals affirmed trial court's summary dismissal, finding that the Department of Corrections (DOC) was authorized to deny inmate's early release based on his failure to obtain approved release address.
DOC denied early release to inmate Blick because he failed to obtain an approved release address. He was released after serving his full sentence. He then sued DOC for the torts of negligence and unla ... wful imprisonment on the theory that DOC wrongfully refused to honor his 52-day early release credit earned during presentence jail time in the county jail.
OUTCOME: Department of Corrections' post-sentence petition granted. Because only DOC has authority to furlough inmates, the trial court's order granting prisoner a furlough is reversed.
Inmate was convicted of domestic violence assault and sentenced to prison. The DOC assessed him as high risk to reoffend violently. However, without telling the DOC, the inmate asked the trial court t ... o grant him a furlough to take care of his children during his wife's high risk pregnancy. The trial court granted the motion on a Friday and ordered the prison to release the inmate by 10 a.m. the next Monday. The DOC filed a motion in the Court of Appeals to stay the order, and the stay was granted. The Court of Appeals subsequently granted the DOC's post-sentence petition, finding that by statute (RCW 72.66.012), only the DOC has authority to grant furloughs, not the trial court.
OUTCOME: Department of Corrections' petition granted. Remanded to the superior court with instructions to provide offender credit toward the post-revocation DOSA prison term for community custody served prior to revocation.
In its order revoking Bercier’s residential Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) sentence, the superior court imposed a standard-range sentence. Also, the order states that Bercier shall receiv ... e no credit toward his post-revocation prison term for any pre-revocation community custody served. But under RCW 9.94A.660(7)(d), the offender must receive credit for “any time” previously served. This includes community custody time. The Department of Corrections petitioned the Court of Appeals to remand for removal of the notation in the revocation order that prohibits credit for community custody time.
OUTCOME: Court of Appeals granted the Department of Corrections' petition and remanded to the superior court to remove unauthorized credits for time served that the court had awarded upon revocation of the offender's DOSA sentence.
After Combs violated his conditions of supervision and the court revoked his Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) sentence, the court imposed a post-revocation prison term. It ordered credit tow ... ard the prison term for 160 days of supervision. The Department of Corrections filed a post-sentence petition asking the Court of Appeals to vacate the award of credits, because RCW 9.94A.171 allows solely the DOC to calculate credit for supervision time served prior to revocation, and because the court erroneously gave credit for time during which the offender had absconded from supervision and time he had spent in jail on unrelated charges.
OUTCOME: Department of Corrections' petition granted. Court of Appeals vacated the order modifying the sentence.
Sex offender was released from prison to supervision and received permission to move to Missouri and be supervised there under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS). His senten ... ce prohibited him from staying overnight where children are sleeping. He asked the superior court to modify the sentence to remove that condition so that he could live with his wife and children. The court granted his request. ICAOS requires that any modification must be agreed to by the state's compact administrator, which in Washington is the Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC did not agree to the modification in this case, however. As a result, the DOC filed a post-sentence petition to ask the Court of Appeals to vacate the order modifying the sentence.
OUTCOME: Dep't of Corrections' motion to modify commissioner's ruling on costs granted. Court of Appeals held that DOC was entitled to $200 statutory attorney fee as prevailing party under RCW 10.73.090.
Offender filed a motion in the trial court asking the court to modify the sentence by granting a specific amount of credits for presentence jail time, because the sentence had left the calculation of c ... redits up to the jail and DOC. The trial court did not rule on the motion but instead transferred it to the Court of Appeals to be treated as a personal restraint petition. The Court of Appeals designated the respondent as the DOC. The prosecutor was not a party. The Court of Appeals ultimately denied the petition. The DOC filed a cost bill as prevailing party for the $200 statutory attorney fee specified in RCW 4.84.080. The court commissioner denied the cost bill, finding that under RCW 10.73.090, the DOC was not entitled to costs in an action challenging the administration of a sentence. Costs under that statute were available only for actions attacking the underlying judgment and sentence. The DOC moved to modify the ruling and the court granted the DOC's motion, holding that the offender's motion was an attack on the judgment and sentence, not on the DOC's administration of the sentence, and therefore, RCW 10.73.090 allowed the DOC to receive costs.
OUTCOME: Offender's petition denied. Court held that Dep't of Corrections had authority to impose sex offender conditions on offender that it was supervising for a non-sex offense, because by statute, DOC conditions need not be crime-related.
An offender was being supervised by the DOC for a robbery conviction. His criminal history included multiple charged and uncharged sex offenses. The DOC's statutory authority to impose conditions, RCW ... 9.94A.704, requires the DOC to consider risk to community safety when deciding what conditions to impose. Thus, its authority is broader than a sentencing court's. The DOC is not limited to crime-related prohibitions. Accordingly, the DOC imposed multiple sex-offender conditions on Golden to reduce the likelihood that he would commit more sex offenses while under DOC supervision. The offender sued, claiming the DOC could impose only crime-related conditions.
OUTCOME: Denial of offender's petition aff'd. Court held that statute was not ex post facto because triggering event was offender's community custody violation, not offender's underlying offense. Therefore, Dep't of Corrections did not apply statute retroactively.
Offender Flint was on early release supervision for a felony conviction when he violated his sentence conditions multiple times. DOC terminated his early release and returned him to prison under former ... RCW 9.94A.737(2). Prisoner claimed DOC violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it applied a statute that was enacted after he committed his underlying crime.
OUTCOME: Inmate's petition denied. Supreme Court held that prisoner had no liberty interest protected by due process in earning early release credits at a 50 percent rate while in prison.
Prisoner filed a personal restraint petition in the Court of Appeals, claiming he was denied due process when his risk classification was changed without advance notice or an opportunity to be heard. T ... he Court of Appeals denied the petition.
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