OUTCOME: Made Same Sex Marriages Legal in California
Opponents of same sex marriage filed writ petitions seeking to prohibit city mayor from issuing marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples. Attorney General also filed original writ petition to resol...ve issue before Supreme Court, 33 Cal.4th 1055, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 95 P.3d 459, which stayed opponents' actions and issued a writ of mandate directing city officials to enforce Family Code provisions defining marriage as between a man and a woman, but expressed no opinion on the constitutional validity of those provisions. City and groups of same sex couples filed actions seeking declaratory judgment that the disputed Family Code provisions were unconstitutional, and those actions were coordinated with opponents' actions into a single proceeding. The Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco, JCCP No. 4365, Richard A. Kramer, J., ruled that the Family Code provisions violated equal protection under the state constitution. State and same sex marriage opponents appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding the constitutionality of the Family Code provisions. The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the Court of Appeal
Family
White v Marciano
Mar 04, 1987
OUTCOME:
In a paternity action, the trial court issued a protective order precluding discovery of the admitted father's net worth and lifestyle, and excluded evidence of them at trial, after the father stipulat...ed that he had an annual income of $1 million and could afford any reasonable support order. The court awarded support in the amount of $1,500 per month, plus medical insurance, and awarded the mother attorney fees of $8,000. (Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CF023955, Stephen M. Lachs and Robert A. Wenke, Judges.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that, once the father admitted his available income, further evidence regarding his lifestyle and net worth were irrelevant, and thus the trial court did not err in precluding discovery and evidence on those issues. It held that the amount awarded was reasonable under the circumstances, considering the standard of living attainable by the income of both parents, and the fact that the award allowed the mother to substantially improve her economic status. It further held that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees in an amount less than that requested by the mother since at least one-half of her attorney's services concerned the irrelevant life-style issue. (Opinion by Fukuto, J., with Roth, P. J., and Gates, J., concurring.)
Employment and labor
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil
N/A
OUTCOME:
Fernandez appeals a judgment in favor of her former employer on her claim of sex discrimination. The district court found that the employer's decision not to promote Fernandez was based on her lack of ...qualifications rather than her sex and was consequently justified by a valid business purpose. Alternatively, it found masculine gender a bona fide occupational qualification since the job sought required dealings with nations that may refuse to transact business with women. The decision is affirmed solely on the former ground
Family
In Re Marriage of Burgess
N/A
OUTCOME: Reversed Court of Appeals Ruling
An order of dissolution of marriage provided for shared joint legal custody by both parents of their two children, with sole physical custody in the mother and a visitation schedule for the father, pur...suant to a mediated temporary agreement. When the mother announced her intention to move with the children to a new city 40 miles from their current home, where she had a new job, the father sought permanent physical custody of the children. The trial court ruled that it was in the best interest of the children that they be permitted to move with the mother and that the father be afforded liberal reasonable visitation, and entered judgment for the mother accordingly. (Superior Court of Kern County, No. 541582, Gary T. Friedman, Judge.) The Court of Appeal, Fifth Dist., Nos. F020504 and F021744, reversed, concluding that the mother had not shown that the move was “reasonably necessary.â€
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that it was in the best interest of the children that they move with their mother. First, and most important, although the children saw their father regularly, their mother was, by parental stipulation and as a factual matter, their primary caretaker. Furthermore, from the outset, the mother had expressed her intention to relocate for employment-related reasons; the mother evinced no intention to frustrate the father's contact with the children. Moreover, despite the fact that the move was for the mother's “convenience,†her proximity to her place of employment and to the children during the workday would clearly benefit the children as well. In addition, the father would be able to visit the children regularly and often. The court further clarified that a parent seeking to relocate with minor children bears no burden of establishing that the move is “necessary†either in the initial judicial custody determination, or in a proceeding for modification of a permanent custody order based on changed circumstances. A trial court adequately satisfies the policy under Fam. Code, § 3020, in favor of “frequent and continuing contact†by ordering liberal visitation with the noncustodial parent if the custodial parent relocates. (Opinion by Mosk, J., with Lucas, C. J., Kennard, George, Werdegar and Chin, JJ., concurring. Concurring and dissenting opinion by Baxter, J.)
Employment and labor
Birtell v Lockheed
N/A
OUTCOME:
Prohibits the discharge of employees who make safety complaints.
Employment and labor
Bass v Great Wesern Saving
N/A
OUTCOME: Salary Discrimination Against Women
The trial court granted an employer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment dismissing an action by a saleswoman alleging that male salespersons working in the same capacity receive...d a larger monthly advance against their commissions than she did. The primary point raised and argued was that plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Fair Employment Practice Act (Lab. Code, § 1410 et seq.). (Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. C 23238, Max F. Deutz, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the action could be treated as one authorized by Lab. Code, § 1197.5, which provides that an employee receiving less than the wage to which he is entitled by reason of sex discrimination may recover “in a civil action the balance of such wages.†Though the court noted that the complaint was not a model of pleading and that it sought damages far in excess of those to which plaintiff was entitled under the statute, it pointed out that it made a decisive allegation that defendant paid more compensation to its male salespersons, who were no more qualified than plaintiff, for substantially the same work performed by her. (Opinion by Roth, P. J., with Fleming and Compton, JJ., concurring.)
Civil rights
Rolon v. Kulwitzky
N/A
OUTCOME:
Plaintiffs, two lesbian women, were refused service in a semiprivate booth at a restaurant owned and operated by defendant. They were offered service at a table in the main dining room of the restauran...t.
It is admitted that the restaurant had, and has, a policy of allowing seating in these booths only by two people of opposite sex; two men, or a couple with children, were not served in the booths.
Section 51 of the Civil Code provides as follows: ‘This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act. *291
‘All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
‘This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin.‘
Chapter IV, article 12, of the Los Angeles Municipal Code does apply to discrimination between hetero and homosexuals. Subdivision 4 of section 49.71 of that article provides: ‘Sexual Orientation. As used in this ordinance, the term 'sexual orientation’ shall mean an individual having or manifesting an emotional or physical attachment to another consenting adult person or persons, or having or manifesting a preference for such attachment, or having or projecting a self-image not associated with one's biological maleness or one's biological femaleness.‘
Subdivision 1 of subsection (a) of section 49.74 provides: ‘Business Practices Generally. It shall be an unlawful business practice for any person to deny any individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any business establishment on the basis (in whole and in part) of such individual's sexual orientation.‘
(1, 2)Several cases have considered and decided the extent of section 51 and of municipal ordinances dealing with discrimination. We glean from those cases: FN1 (1) that the listing of discriminations in section 51 is not exclusive; and (2) that the common law rules relating to the obligation of a business devoted to public service not to discriminate in providing service remains an enforceable duty apart from the prohibition in section 51. While we recognize that the last paragraph of section 51 could be construed, as the trial court construed it, to limit the effect of section 51 to cases involving only discriminations based on sexual differences (or on color, race, religion, *292 ancestry or national origin), subdivision (e) of section 52 of the Civil Code, which sets out the sanctions for a violation of section 51, expressly provides: ‘Actions under this section shall be independent of any other remedies or procedures that may be available to an aggrieved party.‘
FN1 Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 [180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115]; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205 [90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]; Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 712 [195 Cal.Rptr. 325]; Hubert v. Williams (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [184 Cal.Rptr. 161]; Stoumen v. Reilly (1951) 37 Cal.2d 713 [234 P.2d 969]; San Jose Country Club Apartments v. County of Santa Clara (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 948 [187 Cal.Rptr. 493].
Since plaintiffs here do not seek to invoke the sanctions of section 52, we need not here decide whether the language in section 51 limits the imposition of section 52 sanctions.FN2 (3)Clearly, under the cases and the quoted language from section 52, the sanction here sought is a legitimate sanction for the discrimination prohibited by the Los Angeles Code.
FN2 We are here concerned only with the grant of an injunction. Whether, at trial, plaintiffs are entitled to
