Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., et al. 906 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012)
Nov 01, 2012
OUTCOME: Obtained summary judgment for sports agent and sports/entertainment agency
In a widely watched case in the sports industry, Mr. Williams represented an NBA basketball agent as well as one of the world's largest entertainment and sports agencies against a competitor sports age...ncy and its principal in a non-compete/trade secret lawsuit involving claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, interference with contract, defamation, trade libel, conspiracy, and unfair business practices. After discovery and extensive motion practice, the Court granted summary judgment to the sports agent and the talent agency as to all claims asserted against them and those claims were dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the sports agent on his claims for invasion of privacy and violations of California Penal Code § 502 based on his former employer's hacking into his Gmail account.
Employment and labor
Smith v. Sprint/United Management Company, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81077 (E.D. La. June 11, 2012)
Jun 11, 2012
OUTCOME: Obtained summary judgment for client in defense of pregnancy discrimination claims under federal and Louisiana state law
Mr. Williams earned another win before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which dismissed all claims by a former sales associate alleging that the telecommunications provide...r discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. U.S. District Judge Jay C. Zainey granted summary judgment, finding the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she could not identify any similarly situated, non-pregnant employees who were treated more favorably. As an alternative ground for its decision, the Court found even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, she had not offered sufficient evidence suggesting that Sprint’s reasons for discharging the plaintiff were pretextual In particular, the Court determined that the plaintiff's documented history of poor work performance – combined with her deposition testimony admitting that she was properly warned under Sprint's progressive disciplinary policy – were "more than sufficient to demonstrate that [Sprint] had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination." In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that Sprint's evidence establishing that at least three other pregnant employees did not suffer any adverse employment actions during the relevant timeframe undercut any allegations that the plaintiff's termination was the result of discriminatory animus.
OUTCOME: Obtained defense verdict after a bench trial on claims for unpaid bonus compensation and penalty wages asserted by pharmaceutical sales representative and successfully defended appeal of the trial court's decision
Mr. Williams prevailed on behalf of sanofi-aventis (“the Company”) in a Louisiana Wage Payment Act claim filed by Plaintiff Ruth Mora Avila (“Ms. Avila”) seeking to recover unpaid bonus compensation, a...ttorney’s fees, and penalty wages . The Company terminated Ms. Avila in or around October 2009 after an internal investigation determined that some of her business practices and sales activities were in violation of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Code. (The Code governs pharmaceutical representatives’ interactions with healthcare professionals.) As a result of the termination, the Company refused to pay Ms. Avila the non-vested portions of a bonus she received in 2008 under one of the Company’s incentive bonus programs.
After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Company. Ms. Avila filed a timely appeal and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court’s ruling. In reaching this decision, the Fifth Circuit held that the evidence introduced at trial “clearly” demonstrated that Ms. Avila did not satisfy two separate and distinct requirements of the incentive bonus program at the time of her discharge: (i) acceptable performance, and (ii) continued employment with the Company. Because Ms. Avila “did not meet the required qualifications for eligibility at the time of her termination, including continued employment and good standing,” the appellate panel held that she was not entitled to any further bonus payments. Notably, the Fifth Circuit determined that the incentive bonus program’s vesting provisions and continuous employment requirement were valid and enforceable as applied to Ms. Avila because the record evidence below established that “she was discharged from her employment for just cause.”
Employment and labor
Johnson v. Acosta, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106776 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2011)
Sep 20, 2011
OUTCOME: Obtained summary judgment for defendant in federal court action alleging pregnancy discrimination claims under Title VII and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law
Mr. Williams obtained a significant victory for Sprint / United Management Company and Sprint Nextel Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana involving a former assi...stant manager's allegations of pregnancy discrimination. In a 30-page opinion, Judge Joseph Wilkinson granted summary judgment in favor of Sprint on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, and (2) even if she could establish a prima facie case, she could not rebut Sprint's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her employment.
As a threshold matter, the court agreed with Sprint's argument that two alleged comments regarding the plaintiff's pregnancy did constitute direct evidence of discrimination because they were "correct statement[s] of observable fact" and involved "legitimate subjects of which an employer may take notice for work-related purposes." Because there was no direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination, the court concluded that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework should apply.
Applying the McDonnell Douglas test, the court first determined that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she failed to identify any similarly situated non-pregnant individuals who were treated more favorably than her. In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that any allegations of disparate treatment were fatally undermined by the fact that Sprint had discharged another non-pregnant managerial employee at the same time it fired the plaintiff based on the exact same conduct.
The court also held that there was no summary judgment evidence suggesting that Sprint’s articulated reasons for discharging the plaintiff were pretextual. Although the plaintiff attempted to bolster her discrimination allegations by pointing to two other pregnant employees who were also terminated from the same Sprint retail store, the court found the proffered evidence proved nothing given the absence of proof that those employment decisions were motivated by discriminatory animus. The court also rejected the plaintiff's attempts to establish pretext based on her professed disagreement with Sprint's assessment of her work performance. In particular, the court determined that the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs and self-serving testimony that her employment should not have been terminated were insufficient to support an inference of discriminatory intent.
Employment and labor
Johnson, et al v. Sprint United Management Company, et al
Oct 12, 2010
OUTCOME: Motion to Dismiss Granted
The plaintiffs commenced this action in state court against Sprint and their former supervisor, asserting claims for pregnancy and religious discrimination under Title VII and the Louisiana Employment ...Discrimination Law and wrongful termination under Louisiana state law.
After removing the matter to federal court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion to dismiss in it entirety. Specifically, the court dismissed both plaintiffs' discrimination claims against their former supervisor because neither Title VII nor the LEDL provide for the imposition of individual liability. In addition, the court dismissed both plaintiffs' wrongful termination claims against all defendants on the grounds that there is no such cause of action for at-will employees under Louisiana state law. Finally, the court dismissed one plaintiff's discrimination claims against all defendants given her failure to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC as required by Title VII or to provide Sprint with pre-lawsuit notice of claim as required by the LEDL.
The only remaining cause of action is a discrimination claim against Sprint, which the defendants did not seek to dismiss, by the plaintiff who did comply with the notice requirements of Title VII and the LEDL.
Employment and labor
Mary P. Stephens vs. Associated Medical Specialists, P.A., d/b/a Coastal Cancer Center
