James W - Car Wreck Case
Jan 01, 2015OUTCOME: $1.75 Million dollar settlement
James was hit by a careless driver, who was on the job and in a hurry. The insurance company denied his claims and refused to accept responsibility.
Thomas David Davenport Jr's Legal Cases (13)
Pineville, LA
Criminal defense Lawyer at Pineville, LA
Practice Areas: Criminal Defense, Employment & Labor, Ethics & Professional Responsibility
Adams v. City of Alexandria, 878 F. Supp. 2d 685, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97042, 2012 WL 2870841 (W.D. La. 2012)
Jan 01, 2012OUTCOME: Mrs. Adams was successfully and proudly represented by Thomas D. Davenport, Jr.
The Plaintiff, Mrs. Adams, operated “Readings by Faith.” The Plaintiff was a fortune teller. The City of Alexandria prohibited the telling of fortunes in the City. After the Plaintiff tried to obtain a ... business permit, she was visited by an Alexandria City police officer who issued her a summons for fortune-telling in violation of the ordinance. She was ordered to appear in criminal court. The Plaintiff filed suit in federal court claiming the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, overly broad, vague and unconstitutional. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the ordinance violates her constitutional rights. First, the court found it curious that the City avoided in brief discussing the only case we have found within the Fifth Circuit (which is cited in plaintiff's brief), that deals with regulation of fortune tellers. Next, the court found the ordinance was an attempt to ban content based speech altogether. The Court observed: “Based on its own clairvoyance, the City has decreed in brief that it is impossible to predict the future, and contends the business of fortune-telling is a fraud and is inherently deceptive. Ignoring the possibility that, for many people, engaging a fortune-teller could be just for fun—a novelty and a form of entertainment like casino gambling or trying to throw the softball through the rings to win the big bear on the top shelf at the fair —the City argues that prohibiting fortune-telling is necessary in order to prevent fraud and misleading the public. It suggests, without evidence, that the nature of plaintiff's business creates the incentive to give false information to her clients "in the form of brighter futures than they might have in reality. The Court further stated the danger of the government deciding what is true and not true, real and unreal, should be obvious. For example, some might say that a belief in God or in a particular religion or in the "Book of Revelations" is not supported by demonstrable facts. Books that repeat the predictions of Nostradamus and the daily newspaper horoscope could be banned under the City's reasoning. The Court also found if there is to be progress for mankind, men and women must be allowed to dream, imagine, and be visionaries for the future even if there are then no "demonstrable facts" to support their fantasies. And they should be able to share their dreams, imaginations and visions with others free of government interference. While some of those who sometimes predict the future can be said to base their prognostications on education, training and experience—doctors and insurance companies estimating how long someone might live, auto mechanics opining as to how long your brakes will last, even lawyers predicting a jury's likely verdict— there should be no government prohibition of those with fewer facts, gazing into the future and voicing their beliefs as well. To apply the ordinance literally would outlaw every "amateur psychiatrist, parlor sage and barstool philosopher" in Alexandria who dares to suggest to another what the future may hold. In concluding, the court noted: For a government to believe that it knows all that is true and real, no matter how obvious it thinks it is, is arrogance, pure and simple. Our Constitution protects us from such government oppression.” The Court found the City of Alexandria to have violated Mrs. Adams’ First Amendment Rights and the Ordinance unconstitutional as violating citizens' rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Mrs. Adams was proudly represented by Thomas D. Davenport, Jr.
State v. Monk, Criminal Docket No. 309,070, Ninth Judicial District Court
Jan 01, 2012OUTCOME: Thomas D. Davenport, Jr., successfully defended Monk
Monk was arrested for domestic abuse battery. The mother-in-law called the authorities and complained that her adult child may have been the victim of abuse. Based upon this allegation, a sheriff’s d ... eputy arrested Monk. A trial was held. Following the conclusion of the State’s case, Thomas D. Davenport, Jr., moved for a judgment of motion for acquittal because the State failed to prove its case. The Trial Court granted the motion and Monk was acquitted and exonerated
Tjon v. Fitzgerald, 57 So. 3d 615, 2011 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 24 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2011)
Jan 01, 2011OUTCOME: Mr. Tjon was successfully represented by Thomas Davenport, Jr., at trial and on appeal.
Mr. Tjon worked as a day laborer for Dr. Fitzgerald. Dr. Fitzgerald directed Mr. Tjon to get into the lake and hold a post steady so that Dr. Fitzgerald could drive the post into the bed of the lake. D ... r. Fitzgerald chose to use a cinder block to drive the post. The cinder block did not perform the function of a hammer in a satisfactory manner and broke into pieces. One or more of the pieces of cinder block struck Mr. Tjon in the face, causing a cut between his eyes. When the cut healed, a one-inch scar remained between Mr. Tjon's eyes. Mr. Tjon sued Dr. Fitzgerald, seeking medical expenses and general damages. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Mr. Tjon. The trial court awarded $495.00 in medical costs, $15,000.00 in general damages, and $1,000.00 in expert fees. Dr. Fitzgerald appealed the judgment, but was unsuccessful.
Preuett v. Preuett, 38 So. 3d 551, 2010 La. App. LEXIS 611 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2010)
Jan 01, 2010OUTCOME: Mr. Davenport successfully appeals client's case
state and filed motions to gain custody of the children. A trial was held and the trial court gave custody to the mother. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion in chang ... ing the physical custody because the Bergeron standard was not met. The mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment was outweighed by its advantages to the children and that the change was in the best interests of the children pursuant to the factors listed in La. Civ. Code Art. 134. The fact that the children were being alienated from their mother was primarily of the mother's own doing. She voluntarily relocated to Oregon. In considering the various Art. 134 factors that would have militated in favor of a change of custody, there was no overwhelming, clear and convincing evidence to suggest that the harm caused by uprooting the children was substantially outweighed by the benefits of residing with the mother. On the contrary, it would only enhance instability in the children's lives. The Court of Appeal reversed the Trial Court and granted the appeal filed by Mr. Preuett, who was represented by Thomas D. Davenport, Jr., on appeal and at trial.
Setliff v. Slayter, 38 So. 3d 1230, 2010 La. App. LEXIS 828 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2010)
Jan 01, 2010OUTCOME: Mrs. Setliff and her company were successfully represented by Thomas D. Davenport, Jr., on appeal and during the trial.
The Plaintiff, Mrs. Setliff, the owners of a real estate company, filed an action against defendant to recover damages for his breach of a listing agreement. The owner challenged a judgment of the Alex ... andria City Court, which granted the company's motions for summary judgment and awarded it damages, plus interest, court costs, and attorney fees. The owner and company signed a listing agreement to facilitate the sale of a home. The owner argued that he did not own the property. The court of appeal held that the trial court did not err in finding that the owner breached the listing agreement. The owner admitted, under oath, during an injunction hearing that he had both breached and terminated the listing agreement by way of a letter that he sent to the company, informing it that he wished to significantly increase the asking price of the home and directing it to remove its signs from his property. He further admitted, under oath, that he sold the property via a bond for deed contract for an amount significantly less than the asking price noted in the listing agreement. The owners admissions clearly qualified as judicial confessions under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1853. The listing agreement bound the owner personally, regardless of whether he owned the property. The property was simply the subject of the agreement. In the listing agreement, the owner represented that to the best of his knowledge, he was the sole entity having an ownership interest in the property. He also agreed to cooperate fully and not obstruct the sale. The ruling by the Trial Court was affirmed.
Galland v. Bladel, 55 So. 3d 1044, 2010 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 700 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2010)
Jan 01, 2010OUTCOME: Thomas D. Davenport, Jr., successfully represented Jon Bladel.
Dolores Galland filed a claim in Marksville City Court against Bladel, alleging Bladel owed her $ 2,500.00 plus interest for work Galland did on his property. Trial was set and held. The trial court i ... ssued a judgment in favor of Galland against Bladel in the amount of $ 3,121.95. It became apparent that Galland sued the wrong entity and the trial court explained to Galland that she needed to amend her petition to add a new defendant. After the trial was held and a judgment was issued, Galland filed an amending petition adding Bladel Enterprise, LLC and Bladel Homes, LLC as defendants. Then the trial court signed an amended judgment in open court in favor of Galland against Bladel, Bladel Enterprise, and Bladel Homes for the amount of $ 3,881.51. There was no explanation in the record of why the amount was increased. There was no evidence that a hearing was held affording Bladel Enterprise and Bladel Homes to refute the claims against them. Bladel, Bladel Enterprise, and Bladel Homes appealed the judgment and amended judgment. The Court of Appeal first determined that the amended judgment dated April 8, 2010 was an absolute nullity. Then it determined that Galland failed, as a matter of law, to establish the existence of an oral contract. The judgment of February 11, 2010, was therefore reversed.
State v. Cain, 09-390 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/04/09); 2009 La. App. LEXIS 1877
Jan 01, 2009OUTCOME: The Defendant was represented by Thomas D. Davenport, Jr. on the appeal.
The Defendant appealed a judgment of the Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides (Louisiana), which convicted him of illegal use of a weapon, first offense, a violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. ... § 14:94, and sentenced him to serve two years at hard labor, suspended, and ordered him to pay a fine and court costs. The facts of the case were as follows: A sheriff's deputy drove up to Defendant's campsite to investigate a complaint, the Defendant stepped out from beside his truck and fired a warning shot in the air. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it was not foreseeable that the shot could have resulted in death or great bodily harm to a human being. The Defendant was intoxicated when he fired his weapon. However, he was alone on his own property. Further, he fired his gun only once and immediately cooperated with the deputy after ascertaining that he was a police officer. There was no evidence that Defendant's actions could have resulted in death or great bodily harm. According to the deputy, there was no one else around. The Defendant was facing toward his half brother's house, but fired straight up into the air, not in the direction of the home or in the direction of the deputy's person or vehicle. There was no evidence that Defendant pointed the weapon at anyone or anything when he fired it. The deputy was still in his vehicle and testified that he did not hear or see where the bullet came down and the bullet impact did not cause him to flinch or take cover. The Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence.
City of Alexandria v. Sanders
Jan 01, 2008OUTCOME: Not Guilty
A case of small town politics in motion, Sanders was issued a criminal citation. Sanders was unquestionably innocent of any wrongdoing. However, certain city officials sought to prosecute Sanders in cr ... iminal court. After the City put on its case, Thomas D. Davenport, Jr., moved for a judgment of motion for acquittal because the City of Alexandria had no evidence establishing criminal behavior. The Trial Court granted the motion and Sanders was acquitted and exonerated. So far, it appears that the officials of the City of Alexandria stopped the “petty politics.”
Smith v. Goins, 08-938 (La.App. 3 Cir. 07/30/08); 994 So. 2d 591
Jan 01, 2008OUTCOME: Thomas Davenport, Jr., was successful in representing the Defendant at trial and on appeal
The Plaintiff, Smith is an incumbent politician who filed suit to disqualify the challenger, Goins, who was represented by Thomas D. Davenport, Jr. Smith argued that the challenger did not actually res ... ide in the city. The court noted that the challenger was raised in the district; after completing law school in 2006, he returned to the district and continued to reside there until 2007, when he leased an apartment outside of the district. Nevertheless, the challenger continued to maintain a residence in the district and that was reflected on his driver's license, and he received mail at that address. The record established that Goins maintained significant connections to the address sufficient to signify that his residency was real rather than fictitious.
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