Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary

Apr 17, 2014

OUTCOME: Reversed and Remanded

The ministerial exception is best understood as a narrow, more focused subsidiary of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which we will discuss later in this opinion. To this point in our jurisprude ... nce, we have not explicitly adopted the exception in Kentucky or provided guidance as to how courts should determine whether an employee of a church or religious institution is a ministerial employee. Kentucky’s courts have, instead, been burdened with the application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in situations where the ministerial exception might have proved more useful. . . . Regarding the ministerial exception’s solid reasoning or applicability, we find the unanimity displayed by the Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts overwhelmingly persuasive. The Constitution demands recognition of the ministerial exception, so we now incorporate the ministerial exception into our jurisprudence. . . . We are loath to adopt a categorical rule regarding Seminary professors or any other class of individuals who may be considered ministers under the ministerial exception. And, like the United States Supreme Court, we do not adopt a “rigid formula” for deciding if an employee is a minister. “It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers [Kirby], given all the circumstances of [his] employment.” . . . Kirby’s claims based in contract, however, can survive despite our determination that Kirby is a ministerial employee for purposes of the ministerial exception. Our reasoning is two-fold: (1) the enforcement of the contractual arrangement between the Seminary and Kirby does not arouse concerns of government interference in the selection of ministers, and (2) the contract does not involve any matters of ecclesiastical concern that would otherwise bar the suit under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. . . . We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. A question of material fact remains regarding the elements required for a breach of contract claim. The fundamental existence of a contract is in dispute, according to the Seminary. Kirby’s status as a ministerial employee does not, however, bar the claims in contract from proceeding. But the ministerial exception does bar Kirby’s claim of discrimination based on race under KRS 344.040. The approach we adopt today, in dealing with the ministerial exception, strikes a proper and workable balance between religious liberty and individual rights and employment contracts.