Geres v. St. Peter’s Medical Center, 93 N.J.A.R.2nd (WCC) 70 (1992)
Dec 01, 1992OUTCOME: Judgement For Respondent
Petitioner testified that on the morning of January 9, 1990, she was employed by the respondent. She had arrived at work on January 8, 1990, for the purpose of working her shift from 11:00p.m. on Janua ... ry 8, 1990, until 7:00a.m. on January 9, 1990. After finishing her shift, she left St Peter’s Medical Center and crossed Easton Avenue to proceed to her car which she had parked the evening before in a parking lot which belonged to a bank. She slipped and fell on frozen snow and injured herself. The issue is compensability. The parking lot wherein she had parked was concededly not the property of the respondent. Petitioner, however, contended that the only other parking available to her was a partially constructed parking deck on the Medical Center’s property. No employee of the respondent directed the petitioner to park in said parking lot before petitioner’s workday began. At the time of her injury, petitioner was in an area common to the public and not in an area leased to or controlled by the respondent. The petitioner did not prove a prima facie case. NJ.S.A. 34:15-36 states in relevant part: Employment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report to work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment excluding areas not under the control of the employer..” (Emph. Supp.) The phrase “… excluding areas not under the control of the employer” has, of course, been interpreted to find compensable those accidents occurring in areas under the control of the employer. Cressey v. Campus Chefs, Div. of CVI Service, Inc. 204 N.J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 1985). Control has been deemed to include areas that the employer owns, maintains, or designates for use by its employees. Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, supra, at 104. In Livingstone, an employee of respondent Abraham & Straus was struck by a car in the parking lot of the shopping mall where she worked. The court found petitioner’s injuries to be compensable because Abraham & Straus had designated an otherwise underused area of the lot for use by its employees. The court also found that Abraham & Straus had exposed its employees to an added hazard by requiring its employees to park in a distant lot in order that its customers could enjoy the convenience of parking adjacent to its store, thereby enhancing the employer’s business interest Id. at 105, 106. Likewise, petitioner has failed to introduce any evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the petitioner was exposed to an added hazard created by St. Peter’s Medical Center to enhance its own business interests relative to the bank parking lot. St. Peter’s provided onsite parking. Admittedly, had petitioner fallen in the lot located on St. Peter’s Medical Center’s premises, petitioner would be entitled to workers’compensation benefits; but such is not the case here. The alleged hazard created by the frozen snow in the bank’s parking lot is unconnected to petitioner’s’employment and was not imposed upon petitioner as a requirement of her employment. Petitioner had a number of available places to park but the place chosen was not owned, maintained, or controlled by St. Peter’s Medical Center. Petitioner argues that she had an understanding that if she did not want to park in the employer parking lot, she could go across the street to park. Respondent submits that petitioner’s understanding of where she could park (which included the bank’s parking lot), even if correct, is as a matter of law irrelevant. The power of the respondent to control the bank parking lot must be established by persuasive evidence — evidence not forthcoming here.
