Shiner v. Ralston, 2013 PA Super 33, 64 A.3d 1,

Feb 22, 2013

OUTCOME: Superior Court Ruled In Favor Of My Clients and Established the Sudden Medical Emergency Defense

In Shiner v. Ralston, a case of first impression, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recognized a "sudden medical emergency" as an affirmative defense in negligence cases in Pennsylvania. The ruling ... is significant because it sets forth that the burden of proof is on a defendant arguing that a sudden medical emergency caused an underlying incident, such as losing consciousness at the wheel and causing an accident with another driver. In Shiner v. Ralston, according to the court's opinion, the defendants presented an autopsy report indicating that the decedent had a cardiac episode before his pickup truck traversed a grass median and struck a vehicle driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered injuries in the collision and the driver of the other vehicle was pronounced dead at the scene. Moving for summary judgment, the Defendants pointed to what they called "the exception from liability in motor vehicle cases where a sudden unforeseen loss of consciousness by a driver results in an accident," according to the opinion. But the unanimous three-judge panel, delivering its ruling as a per curiam opinion, distinguished the "sudden emergency doctrine" from the "sudden medical emergency defense" in reversing a Centre County judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court said the Defendants had merely denied negligence where they needed to plead Ralston's sudden unconsciousness as an affirmative defense in a new matter. The panel noted the doctrine, which is not a defense, provides that an individual is not held to the "usual degree of care" or required to exercise his or her "best judgment" if confronted with a sudden emergency. However, the doctrine does not relieve an individual of responsibility to exercise reasonable care to avoid an accident, which means that, unlike an affirmative defense, the doctrine does not need to be pled under Pa.R.C.P. 1030(b) on affirmative defenses. On the other hand, the sudden medical emergency defense, which had yet to be applied by a Pennsylvania appellate court, allows a successful defendant to avoid negligence, if he or she raises it as an affirmative defense and proves it. "In holding that [Ralston's] unconsciousness 'rendered him incapable of exercising any level of judgment,' the trial court found, as a matter of law, that no reasonable care was expected," the court's opinion said. "Furthermore, as a result of the confusion between the doctrine and the defense, the trial court improperly placed the burden upon the [Plaintiffs] to disprove that the loss of consciousness was sudden and unexpected, rather than upon [Defendants] to prove it affirmatively." According to the opinion, the Plaintiffs presented expert medical testimony refuting the assertion that the decedent experienced a sudden medical condition. The Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Bennet Omalu, opined that Ralston suffered a cardiac syncope because of coronary atherosclerosis and heart disease and should have experienced signs that would have allowed him to react and avoid the crash. Defense experts had indicated that the decedent's heart showed signs of significant coronary atherosclerosis, consistent with his suffering a cardiac disrhythmia before the crash. In other words, there was a dispute among the experts as to whether Ralston had experienced a "sudden" medical condition prior to the collision. But that seemed somewhat of a moot point, anyway. "Although it was unnecessary for the Shiners to produce any evidence on the issue, Dr. Omalu's opinion further demonstrates that there is an issue of fact for the jury to resolve," the opinion said. "The Legal Intelligencer" March 5, 2013