Attorney Dominic Gerardo Flamiano's Legal Cases

Trucking accident

GLOBAL HAWK INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerry LE, Defendant and Appellant (A137976)

Apr 14, 2014

OUTCOME: DISPOSITION The summary judgment is reversed. Le shall recover his costs on appeal.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California NorCal Logistics Lawyers Group, Dominic G. Flamiano, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. Carpenter, Zuckerman, & Rowley, John C. Carpenter, M ... aureen Johnson, Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. Appellant Jerry Le was one of two truck drivers on a cross-country trip for V & H Transport (V & H), a trip for which he would be paid a lump sum of $1,100, with no deductions. Le was seriously injured when, while he was asleep, the other driver was involved in a one-vehicle accident. After the accident, V & H refused to pay Le the lump sum promised, telling him that he did not finish the trip. He was also told he was not an employee, and would not be eligible for worker's compensation. Le sued V & H and its owners for his injuries, who tendered defense to Global Hawk Insurance Company (Global Hawk), which insured V & H under a commercial auto truckers liability insurance policy. Global Hawk refused the defense, and filed an action for declaratory relief, contending that Le's injuries were excluded from coverage because he was an employee. Global Hawk moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, ignoring the pertinent facts in the case and holding that the definition of employee in certain federal regulations—regulations, not incidentally, enacted for the benefit of the public and nowhere mentioned in the insurance policy—controlled. We reverse.

Trucking accident

Global Hawk Insurance Co. v. Century-National Insurance Co. (A131656)

Feb 29, 2012

OUTCOME: Judgment in favor of the insurer of the injured driver's employer is affirmed, where the interstate trucking insurer was liable for the collision under the terms of a financial responsibility endorsement that it was required to provide to its insured.

California Court of Appeal In a dispute between insurance companies over who was liable to pay benefits after the insurer of an interstate trucking company, whose employee caused the accident, erroneo ... usly refused to pay, causing the injured employee to obtain uninsured motorist benefits from his employer's insurer.

Insurance

Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Sovereign Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. (#C049036)

Dec 03, 2006

OUTCOME: Judgment for defendant-insured is affirmed.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California Judgment for defendant-insured in a declaratory relief action brought by an insurer in a coverage dispute over an errors and omissions policy is affirmed wh ... ere, although a policy term "claim first brought" was ambiguous, the reasonable interpretation of the term was that a claim was first -brought- at the place where it was first tendered or -made. Judges BLEASE, Acting P.J. Court California Court of Appeal Counsel For Appellant: Selman Breitman, Alan B. Yuter and Rachel E. Hobbs, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant. For Appellees: Aguilar & Sebastinelli, Dominic G. Flamiano for Defendant and Respondent.

Insurance

NATIONAL CASUALTY CO, v. SOVEREIGN GENERAL INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. (#C049036)

Mar 14, 2006

OUTCOME: We shall affirm the judgment.

Selman Breitman, Alan B. Yuter and Rachel E. Hobbs, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Aguilar & Sebastinelli, Dominic G. Flamiano for Defendant and Respondent. This is a declaratory relief ac ... tion. The plaintiff, National Casualty Company (National), appeals from a judgment in favor of Sovereign General Insurance Services, Inc. (Sovereign), National's insured under a policy of errors and omissions insurance. The policy is a claims-made policy. The policy period was August 17, 2000, to August 17, 2001. The policy covered Sovereign for its actual or alleged negligent acts, errors or omissions, libel, slander, or invasion of privacy, provided the claim for such act(s) was made within the policy period and was brought in the United States, Puerto Rico, or Canada. Sovereign was authorized to issue certificates of insurance by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London (Lloyd's) and to process claims for Lloyd's. On March 20, 2001, attorneys for Lloyd's sent a letter to Sovereign at its offices in Stockton, California, asserting that Sovereign's underwriting and claims handling activities engaged in pursuant to agreements between Lloyd's and Sovereign, had caused Lloyd's to suffer losses, and that Lloyd's intended to recover such losses from Sovereign. Sovereign submitted the claim to National. The letter was sent during the policy period and National does not dispute that the letter constituted a claim made during the policy period for the purpose of determining coverage. The agreements between Sovereign and Lloyd's provided for mandatory arbitration in London, England, of any disputes arising out of the agreements. Slightly less than three years after Lloyd's sent Sovereign its first letter demanding payment of its losses, and two years after this declaratory relief action was commenced, Lloyd's instituted arbitration proceedings in London against Sovereign to recover its alleged losses. The issue on appeal is whether the claim made against Sovereign during the policy period was also “first brought” within the United States, Puerto Rico or Canada.1 National argues the only way to “bring” a claim is to file or institute some sort of legal action and, since the legal action (the arbitration) was filed in London, the claim was not brought within the coverage territory of the policy. However, the term “claim” is defined in the policy as “a demand or assertion of a legal right seeking damages” and includes, but is not limited to, an arbitration proceeding. We shall conclude the term “claim first brought” is ambiguous, but the reasonable interpretation of the term in light of the policy as a whole is that a claim is first “brought” at the place where it is first tendered or “made.” This reading is consistent with the fact that otherwise the majority of Sovereign's business would not be covered by the insurance it purchased.

Medical malpractice

David A. GILL et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. J. Ronald RICH et al., Defendants and Appellants. No. B158336.

Apr 29, 2005

OUTCOME: The judgment as to Dr. Mir is reversed. Dr. Mir is entitled to his costs on appeal. The judgments as to all other appellants are affirmed. With regard to these other appellants, the receiver is entitled to costs on appeal.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, George E. Schulman, Richard K. Diamond, John J. Bingham and John N. Tedford, IV, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff ... s and Respondents. Aguilar & Sebastinelli, Raul V. Aguilar, San Francisco, Allen J. Kent, and Dominic G. Flamiano, for Defendant and Appellant, J. Ronald Rich. Wise Pearce Yocis & Smith and Michael J. Pearce, Long Beach, for Defendant and Appellant, Jehan Zeb Mir. I. Hundreds of physicians and surgeons formed an interindemnity arrangement pursuant to Insurance Code section 1280.7 to provide an alternative to medical malpractice insurance. In doing so, they funded a trust, Physicians Interindemnity Trust (PIT). Eventually, the trust was forced into receivership because it could not meet its obligations. Appellants are 47 members of PIT who refused to pay assessments levied on them by the receiver. In the matter before us, the receiver obtained judgments against appellants for the unpaid assessments. Appellants appeal from these judgments and from a number of preliminary orders. In the published parts of this opinion (pts. I., II., III.A, III.B, III.C, and IV.), we hold that appellants (1) could not rescind their contracts with PIT; (2) were responsible for the assessments; and (3) remained responsible for assessments even though their memberships had been terminated. In an unpublished part of this opinion (pt. III.D), we reject appellants' contention that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the receiver to amend the complaint. In another unpublished part of this opinion (pt. III.E), we conclude that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment against one appellant, Dr. Jehan Zeb Mir.

Medical malpractice

Gill v. Rich, B158336

Apr 29, 2005

OUTCOME: An assessment levied onto members of the failed trust is affirmed where defendants cannot rescind their contracts with the trust.

California Court of Appeal In a receivership action concerning a trust providing an alternative to medical malpractice insurance. Judges ALDRICH, J. Court California Court of Appeal Counsel For ... Appellees: Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, George E. Schulman, Richard K. Diamond, John J. Bingham and John N. Tedford, IV, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Respondents., Aguilar & Sebastinelli, Raul V. Aguilar, San Francisco, Allen J. Kent, and Dominic G. Flamiano, for Defendant and Appellant, J. Ronald Rich., Wise Pearce Yocis & Smith and Michael J. Pearce, Long Beach, for Defendant and Appellant, Jehan Zeb Mir.

Construction and development

MARYLAND CASUALTY CO, v. NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE CO OF CA. (#D020940)

Sep 04, 1996

OUTCOME: The trial court correctly determined NAICC was required to defend Midway Homes in the Lake Park Terrace action. The fact the trial court found a duty to defend does not cut off NAICC's right to litigate its concealment defense in some other forum.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California Fisher & Hurst, Dennis Gildea and Dominic G. Flamiano, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant. Haasis, Pope & Correll, Terrell A. Quealy, S ... an Diego, Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard and Robert V. Closson, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In this declaratory relief action between successive third party liability carriers, National American Insurance Company of California (NAICC) appeals a summary judgment in favor of Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland) determining NAICC had a duty to defend its insured, developer Midway Homes, Inc. and related parties (Midway Homes), in underlying condominium construction defect litigation. NAICC contends (1) Maryland had no standing to enforce a duty owed their mutual insured and (2) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (a) Maryland alone was obligated to defend Midway Homes and (b) Midway Homes concealed property damages existing before NAICC's policy period. We conclude the contentions are without merit and accordingly affirm the judgment.

Dominic Gerardo Flamiano's Legal Cases (7)