David M. Hazan's Legal Cases (20)

Civil rights

Davis v. City of New York, 10-cv-00699-SAS-HBP ( S.D.N.Y. )

Mar 28, 2013

OUTCOME: Motions For Summary Judgment Decided

On January 28, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority. T ... he plaintiffs included Black and Latino New York City Housing Authority tenants and their guests who were arrested while visiting. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Legal Aid Society, and the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs claimed continuing violations of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; the United States Housing Act, 42, U.S.C. § 1437, et seq.; the Constitution and laws of the state of New York; and the New York City Human Rights Law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA"), through the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), maintained an unlawful patrol and trespass arrest policy that resulted in a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures, questioning, searches, and false arrests of residents of, and authorized visitors to, NYCHA residences. The NYPD conducted vertical patrols, which are top-to-bottom walk-through patrols or "sweeps" of hallways, stairwells, rooftops and landings, elevators, and other common areas of a NYCHA residence. The complaint alleged that the police stopped and questioned residents and their visitors without objective individualized suspicion of crime and unlawfully arrested them for trespass without probable cause. The plaintiffs further alleged that the trespass laws were being enforced in and around NYCHA residences on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin in an intentionally discriminatory manner, because the patrols focused on NYCHA residences that were predominantly African American and Latino. Nine of the original eighteen plaintiffs accepted Rule 68 offers for settlement. (Four accepted on October 4, 2010 and five accepted on December 20, 2010). On October 4, 2012, the Court (J. Scheindlin) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions for summary judgment. Davis v. City of New York, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144040, 2012 WL 4761494 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012). This opinion adjudicated only the individual circumstances of plaintiffs' arrests and tenancies; it did not adjudicate defendants' practices and policies. It it very detailed and takes a scalpel to parts of the claims and to the list of defendants who can press each claim, but leaves much intact for trial. The Court did not rule definitively on the Equal Protection claims against the City, the Title VI claims, the Fair Housing Act claims, the state and city law claims against NYCHA, nor the United States Housing Act claim against NYCHA because those issues required further briefing. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of NYCHA regarding the equal protection claims (because plaintiffs did not show that NYCHA was liable for the arrests), to the City on state and city human rights law violations, and to defendants on the substantive due process claims (because the Court found them duplicative). The court denied summary judgment on § 1981 claims regarding two plaintiffs and denied summary judgment on plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. On March 28, 2013, the Court (J. Scheindlin) granted in part and denied in part defendants motions for summary judgement. This opinion granted NYCHA's motion for summary judgement on all remaining NYSC claims as well as granting summary judgement on the remaining race discrimination claims. The Court denied summary judgement on section 1981, FHA, Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and USHA claims.

Civil rights

Floyd v. City of New York, 08 CV 01034 (SAS)(HBP) (S./D.N.Y)

Jan 01, 2013

OUTCOME: Settlement After Trial While Case was Being Considered by the 2nd Circuit on Appeal

On January 31, 2008, four African-American men who had been stopped and frisked in the City of New York brought this class action § 1983 suit against the City in the U.S. District Court for the Souther ... n District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the City had engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City had implemented and was continuing to enforce, encourage and sanction a policy and practice of unconstitutional "stop and frisks" by the New York Police Department ("NYPD"), targeting black and Latino residents without the reasonable articulable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. On February 24, 2011, the City moved for summary judgment, and on August 31 the Court (Judge Scheindlin) granted in part and denied in part the City's motion. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It held that the City was entitled to summary judgment on the individual claims of plaintiff Floyd, but that it was not so entitled on the claims of the other plaintiffs or on the class claims of racial profiling under Title VI and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, and on November 23, 2011, the Court (Judge Scheindlin) found that new evidence presented by plaintiffs created a dispute of fact that called into question the reasonableness of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk of plaintiff Floyd, and thus reinstated Floyd's individual claims. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The case headed to bench trial before Judge Scheindlin. Trial proceeded on the class-based injunctive issues, only. That trial was held beginning March 2013; proceedings took over 30 days, and concluded in May 2013. On August 12, 2013, Judge Scheindlin issued two opinions finding the NYPD liable, ordering changes to the department's stop and frisk procedures, and appointing a monitor to oversee the changes. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) and 959 F.Supp.2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Judge Scheindlin held that the NYPD violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, due to the department officials' deliberate indifference regarding the officers' clearly unconstitutional searches and the fact that the searches were so widespread that they held the force of law. Further, the NYPD violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to the indirectly racially-targeted searches and by displaying deliberate indifference to the discriminatory nature of these searches. In other words, Judge Scheindlin found that the searches violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights regardless of whether the disparate result of the search policy was intentional. Beyond the findings of law, Judge Scheindlin also issued an order setting forth the procedures that the NYPD must adopt to remedy the situation. The order mandated that a monitor would be appointed to oversee reforms. The monitor will be tasked with consulting with the parties to develop "a set of reforms of the NYPD's policies, training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline regarding stop and frisk." As a monitor, she chose Peter Zimroth, former New York Corporation Counsel and former First Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan. The city appealed. On October 31, 2013, the Second Circuit stayed the operation of all orders while that appeal is pending, and also ruled that "District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges" in (a) speaking to the press and (b) encouraging the plaintiffs' counsel in Daniels to file the Floyd litigation, separately, rather than litigating racial profiling as part of Daniels -- particularly in stating that she would treat the new case as related.

Civil rights

Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F. Supp. 2d 418 (KAM)

Sep 05, 2012

OUTCOME: Defendants' Motion Denied in part and case settled

On October 29, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and New York law, Mkubwa Matthews and Zambena Allan ("plaintiffs") filed this action against the City of New York ("the City") and ind ... ividual defendants Sergeant Louis Marino, Police Officers Matthew Granahan, Kenneth Miller, and Vitali, and two unidentified members of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), John Doe and Richard Roe (the "Individual Defendants," together with the City, the "defendants"). Plaintiffs assert constitutional claims pursuant to Section 1983 against the Individual Defendants for unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, excessive force, and failure to intervene, a Monell claim against the City for the same constitutional violations, and analogous claims under New York law. Presently before the court is defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Civil rights

Swinton v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 2d 3 (RJD)(RML) (EDNY)

Mar 28, 2011

OUTCOME: Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice..

Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 USC §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and New York State law, arising from plaintiffs' arrest and conviction on charges relating to the severe malnutrition of their newborn infan ... t. Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. As this case has been the subject of extensive prior judicial proceedings and media reporting, the parties tend to agree on the relevant facts. On July 31, 2000, Ice Swinton ("Ice") was born to Joseph and Silva Swinton. At birth, Ice weighed less than three pounds. From birth, the Swintons fed Ice what they believed to be a strict vegan diet. On or around November 16, 2001, after several anonymous calls to the Administration of Child Services ("ACS") which the Swintons later discovered were made by Ice's aunt, Emergency Medical Technicians removed Ice from her parents' home in Queens and brought her to the hospital. Doctors observed that Ice, then sixteen months old, had low levels of vitamin D and calcium, resulting in rickets, and suffered from severe malnutrition. Up to that point, the Swintons had never taken Ice to a doctor despite the baby's noticeable developmental delays, soft spot on the skull, complete lack of teeth and abnormal amount of body hair. "[T]he strict vegetarian diet provided by the defendants was to blame for Ice's many maladies." People v. Swinton ("Swinton I"), 21 A.D.3d 1039, 1041, 801 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dep't 2005) (Miller, J., dissenting in part). Ice spent the next five months recovering in various hospitals. During this time, the Swintons consulted with ACS representatives about regaining custody of Ice. Pursuant to ACS's instruction, the Swintons enrolled in parenting and nutrition classes and programs. During the same five-month period, Queens County Assistant District Attorneys ("ADAs") Eric Rosenbaum and Marjory Fisher and New York City Police Department ("NYPD") Detective Janet Barry, all now defendants, investigated the Swintons' treatment of Ice. ACS eventually recommended that the District Attorney's ("DA's") Office not pursue criminal charges due to the Swintons' absence of history with ACS and apparent lack of desire to harm their child. Of the witnesses interviewed as part of the investigation, none professed a belief that the Swintons had intended to harm Ice. On April 25, 2002, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Detective Barry arrested the Swintons at their home. According to the Amended Complaint, Detective Barry, acting without a warrant, initially informed Mr. Swinton that the NYPD was investigating a reported domestic violence incident. Mr. Swinton denied that such an incident had occurred and refused the Detective entry. Ms. Swinton then came to the door to confirm that no domestic violence had taken place. After the Detective twice more requested to enter the house, Mr. Swinton, allegedly feeling intimidated, "believed he had no choice but to comply." Detective Barry and the other officers entered and, according to the Amended Complaint, searched the premises before demanding that the Swintons produce Ice. The Swintons replied "that infant Ice was not on the premises and that in fact she had been removed from the home and [had been] at the hospital" for the past five months. After Detective Barry allegedly called the DA's Office for instructions, the officers arrested the Swintons, brought them to the precinct house and charged them with first-degree assault, first-degree reckless endangerment and endangering the welfare of a child. That same evening, Queens DA Richard Brown held a press conference to announce the arrest. During the press conference, which was widely reported on television and radio stations, DA Brown showed the Swintons' arrest photos, called the Swintons "monsters" and reported "that he had full knowledge and supported the arrest and charges" of the Swintons.

Civil rights

Escobar v. City of New York, 766 F. Supp. 2d 415. (ENV) (CLP)

Feb 07, 2011

OUTCOME: Summary Judgment Granted in favor of defendant City of New York

Plaintiff Victor Escobar sues, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants New York City, the New [417] York City Police Department (" ... NYPD"), Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Detective Edward Jacobowski, Detective Al Arce, Sergeant Ernest Barelli, District Attorney for Queens County Richard Brown, and Assistant District Attorney for Queens County Gregory Pavlides. All claims against NYPD, Kelly, Brown, Pavlides, Jacobowski, Arce, and Barelli were dismissed pursuant to Orders issued by this Court dated June 25, 2007, December 8, 2008, and February 22, 2010. The City, the sole remaining defendant, moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the outstanding claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concluded that plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law, and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in favor of the City.

Civil rights

Nicole Paultre Bell, as Administratrix of the Estate of Sean Bell, et. al, v. City of New York, et. al., CV 07 2994

Oct 06, 2010

OUTCOME: Settlement

On July 24, 2007, the fiancée of Sean Bell, a 23-year-old black man fatally shot by the police on the night before his wedding, and two men harmed during the shooting, filed a lawsuit in the United Sta ... tes District Court for the Eastern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a jury trial and sought monetary damages. On November 25, 2006, Sean Bell departed a strip club in Queens with two friends at 4:00AM. The three men climbed into a car and Bell proceeded to drive. The car allegedly struck a police detective in the leg and hit a police van before five officers began to shoot at the car, firing over 50 bullets. The shooting resulted in the death of Sean Bell, as well as serious personal injuries to the two passengers. Bell’s fiancé, as the adminstratrix of his estate, accused the police of wrongful death, assault, negligence and various civil rights violations. Specifically, she claimed that the police shot Bell without probable cause, that the shooting was performed negligently and recklessly, and that it was performed without reason or provocation. The NYPD’s failure to adequately train these officers, combined with the officers’ failure to observe existing police protocol, deprived the decedent of his Fourteenth Amendment privileges, namely: his right to due process of law, his right to liberty, his right to be free from excessive force, and most importantly, his right to life. With him in the car were two of Bell’s friends, who survived the shooting and were placed under arrest. These plaintiffs sustained severe physical injuries as a result of the shooting, and alleged that the officers lacked probable cause to discharge their weapons and similarly lacked probable cause to place them under arrest. Claiming that the shooting was performed negligently and recklessly, and without reason or provocation, the plaintiffs stated that the officers deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, liberty, and the right to be free from physical injury and unwarranted use of force. The plaintiffs also asserted that they were subjected to false arrest and imprisonment. All plaintiffs in the suit sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages. After negotiations, the plaintiffs and defendants reached a settlement agreement. The parties agreed to dismiss the action against the defendants, with prejudice, but without costs, expenses, or attorneys’ fees to exceed: $3.25 million to the administratrix of Bell’s estate, and $3 million and $900,000 respectively to Bell’s two friends that were injured in the shooting. The plaintiffs additionally agreed to release the defendants from any and all liability or claims that could have been alleged in this particular action. On October 6, 2010, Judge Roanne L. Mann entered a stipulation of the settlement and order of dismissal.

Civil rights

Escobar v. City of New York, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142 (ENV)(CLP)

Feb 22, 2010

OUTCOME: Defendants Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Police Officers For Improper Service

The plaintiff claimed that an unlawful search of his vehicle resulted in the seizure of a large sum of currency and his false arrest and malicious prosecution. As a result, the plaintiff claimed to hav ... e suffered physical and emotional distress. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff not only failed to submit affidavits of service, but the documentation submitted in lieu of affidavits of service was insufficient to prove that the police officers were properly served under N.Y. C.P.L.R § 308. The plaintiff failed to cure the problem of improper service and to comply or show good cause as to why he was unable to serve the officers. Therefore, because the magistrate's recommendation of dismissal of the plaintiffs §§ 1981 and 1983 claims with prejudice was appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the plaintiff was not entitled to a traverse hearing to determine whether service was valid.

Civil rights

Miller v. Green, 05-CV-2548 (CBA)(LB)

Dec 22, 2009

OUTCOME: Plaintiff's Claims Dismisssed

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. The court held that the claims against the correctional officers were time-barred because the correctional officers were not identified or served within the t ... hree-year statute of limitations and the prisoner's initial identification of the officers as "John and Steve Doe" was not a mistake concerning the identity of the proper parties which would allow relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3). The prisoner failed to state a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against the commissioner because the prisoner did not alleged that the commissioner was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Although the captain was served after 120 days had passed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and after the three-year statute of limitations for the underlying cause of action had expired, the court found good cause for the delay because the prisoner was entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) to effect timely service and the prisoner was not responsible of the failure of the USMS to locate and serve the captain. The prejudice to the captain was not outweighed by the harm that would have been suffered by the prisoner if his claims were dismissed. Miller v. Green, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59887 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 2008). Thereafter, by motion dated December 8, 2009, defendant informed the Court that plaintiff failed to comply with the Court's order directing him to sign and return medical releases and moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f), 37(b)(2) and 41(b). Defendant's motion under Rules 16(f) and 37(b)(2)(A)(v) was granted and plaintiff's case was dismissed. Miller v; Green, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124105

Civil rights

Kapiti v. Kelly, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34432 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 28, 2008) (RMB)

Aug 18, 2008

OUTCOME: Motion for Class Certification Denied

Plaintiff, a motorist whose vehicle was seized by defendant city police, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 for declaratory relief and damages arising out of the seizure. The motorist mov ... ed, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to certify the case as a class action. He also sought reconsideration of an order granting the city police's discovery of his sealed criminal and impoundment records. The motorist alleged that the city police violated his rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause by illegally, unconstitutionally, and arbitrarily retaining and selling the seized vehicle without providing him the opportunity for a prompt hearing on the validity of its seizure and continued retention. The posture of the case was that discovery had just closed, but the motorist had just moved for class certification. He acknowledged that none of the pleadings asserted class-wide claims or defenses, and that he had not sought leave of the court to amend the complaint to add class allegations. The motion for class certification was prejudicially untimely. Also, the motorist's delay in seeking class certification and the fact that his counsel has not handled many class actions showed that the motorist would not adequately represent the interests of the proposed class. The sealed records were subject to discovery as the privilege conferred by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 160.50 was waived by filing the suit. The motorist's motion for class certification and for reconsideration of the court's discovery order was denied.

Civil rights

Miro v. Chiusano, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50650 (DAB) (SDNY)

Jul 01, 2008

OUTCOME: Defendants' motion to dismiss granted in its entirey

Plaintiff Miguel Miro filed two related cases. In his first Complaint, docketed at 05 Civ. 10570, Plaintiff originally sued Defendant City of New York, as well as unnamed City employees and police offi ... cers. In his second Complaint, docketed at 06 Civ. 5148 Plaintiff sued Defendant Detective Michael Chiusano, Shield # 559. The claims in both complaints arise out of the allegedly unlawful arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff for criminal possession of a controlled substance on March 28, 2003. On February 21, 2007, this Court granted Defendants Motion Dismiss Complaint # 1 and granted Plaintiff leave to amend so that Plaintiff could 1) "allege more specifically his malicious prosecution claim against all Defendants" 2) "provide detailed allegations about any series of constitutional deprivations that may have been sanctioned by City policymaking authorities to investigate the shooting of specific police officers" and 3) "name Detective Michael Chiusano, Shield # 559 as a defendant in his malicious prosecution claim, as properly detailed and pleaded." (Order (DAB), Feb. 22, 2007, dkt. no. 12.) By that same Order the Court dismissed Complaint # 2 in its entirety. On March 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed an "Amended Complaint" at docket number 05 Civ. 10570, but naming in the caption only "Detective Michael Chiusano, Shield # 559." The City of New York was not listed in the caption at all. Despite not being named in the Caption, the City of New York moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint to which the Plaintiff responded, and the City replied. (05 Civ. 10570 (DAB), dkt no. 15, 20, 22.) There are two issues before the Court. First, whether the Amended Complaint, which fails to name the City of New York, can nevertheless stand against the City. And, second, whether the [3] causes of action asserted against Detective Michael Chiusano can survive given that, to date, Plaintiff has failed to serve that Defendant. As detailed herein, the Amended Complaint must be DISMISSED in its entirety. Plaintiff is DENIED leave to amend as to Detective Michael Chiusano.

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