Client was accused of rape/sexual violence and harassment/stalking by girlfriend who sought a 5 year restraining order per FC6200 et seq. Client denied raping petitioner, and denied stalking. Petitioner and client had consentual sex following a ski trip. After client gave consentual oral sex to Petitioner, they had intercourse. At some point during intercourse, petitioner alleged she requested that client stop. Client said that she only requested to move because she was uncomfortable. Client asserted that the resumption was mutually consented. Petitioner alleged that she had made numerous requests to stop. Petitioner further alleged that client "obsessed" and "stalked" her with excessive calls and text messages.
Client and Petitioner are both very religious and belong to the same church. Restraining order effectively barred client from attending the church, as there is only one service per week.
At trial, petitioner further alleged that she had explicitly declined consent to sex prior to intercourse.
Petitioner sought a 5 year DV restraining order.
Client asserted that (1) the sex was consented. (2) Petitioner stated during sex that she was uncomfortable, and requeted to stop. (3) He complied, and the repositioned, and mutually resumed. He alleged that his contacts with her over the next two days were based on concern for her, and that when he was asked to stop contacting her, he did, other than e-mailing her a single apology letter.
Court ruled that client was sincere and non-harassing in his efforts to contact Petitioner, and that he was not harassing or stalking her. Court believed she genuinely wanted to stop the intercourse, but that client in good faith failed to understand her wishes.
Court granted a restraining order for only 60 days, and after 4 weeks, client may resume attendance at church, provided that the Pastor invites him to return.
People v. Corey D.
Mar 25, 2008
Client was accused of Rape of Intoxicated Woman, The incident involved a co-worker and took place in the home of another co-worker, who alleged that he witnesses client having intercourse with accuser while she was apparently asleep. Client also faced a similar accusation in a 2004 trial.
State v. Erikkson
Oct 27, 2006
Hung jury and subsequent negotiated plea
Jim Parkman, Alec Rose and I represented "The Ferrari Guy" who was charged with embezzling 2 Ferrari Enzos and a Mercedes McLaren. The trial took place in Los Angeles, California.
Mr. Erikkson was arrested after being involved in a crash in the red Ferrari Enzo where it is alleged he was traveling 190 miles per hour on the Pacific Coast Highway when he ran into a telephone pole. He walked away with only a busted lip. He was also charged with DUI from this incident. There was an additional charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a two week trial and a hung jury, we worked out a plea agreement to resolve all charges.
People v. Pinedo
Apr 26, 2005
Affirmed lower court judgment in favor of client
A criminal complaint against Mr. Pinedo was dismissed in the Superior Court based on a finding that Mr. Pinedo had been prejudiced by a delay in prosecution and denied due process. The prosecution did not appeal, but filed a new complaint. The court dismissed again. The People appealed. The Court of Appeal sustained the lower ruling:
Indeed, in discussing an appeal of the dismissal order, in United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at page 312, 92 S.Ct. 455, the court indicated that the motion to dismiss was a â€œ â€˜motion in bar.â€™ â€ It acknowledged that the pretrial dismissal there â€œwas beyond the power of the Government to cure since re-indictment would not have been permissible under such a ruling.â€ ( Ibid.) The court also characterized the motion to dismiss as follows: â€œ[T]he motion to dismiss rested on grounds that had nothing to do with guilt or innocence or the truth of the allegations in the indictment but was, rather, a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance, that is, where the defendant does not deny that he has committed the acts alleged and that the acts were a crime, but instead pleads that he cannot be prosecuted because of some extraneous factor, such as the running of the statute of limitations or the denial of a speedy trial.â€ ( Marion, at p. 312., 92 S.Ct. 455)
Based on the above authority and the California dicta in Crockett v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.3d 433, 121 Cal.Rptr. 457, 535 P.2d 321, we conclude that a dismissal, even by a magistrate, on this due process ground terminates the proceedings and is an order that must be appealed or it becomes final. In Crockett, the California Supreme Court addressed the operation of the statutory provisions that supplement a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, e.g., section 1381.