Could a violation of the state property maintenance code prove negligence in personal injury case?

The main thing that is important is whether the violation automatically proves negligence (which is called "negligence per se") or alternatively, if the violation is merely evidence of negligence. I am a Florida lawyer, but a quick search of New York law revealed the following case law, which seems to be right on point..........



Plaintiff was injured falling from the fifth row of a set of bleachers adjacent to a softball field at John F. Kennedy High School, a public school in the Bronx. Plaintiff brought a negligence suit against the City of New York and the New York City Board of Education, claiming a violation of § 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code. This provision states that protective guards shall be provided at the open ends of bleachers from the front third row to the highest row of seats. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on liability, holding that Defendants' violation of the Building Code constituted negligence per se. The court submitted the issues of causation and damages to the jury, which found Defendant liable for Plaintiffçs injuries, and awarded damages. The Appellate Division modified the judgment and directed a new trial on the issue of damages, barring Plaintiff's agreement to reduced damages. The Plaintiff agreed to a reduction. The Appellate Division affirmed the remainder of the trial court's judgment.

Defendants appealed the finding of negligence per se, contending that § 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the Administrative Code is a municipal ordinance, thus violations of the section constitute only evidence of negligence. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversed the Appellate Division's verdict, and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeals first analyzed the legislative history of the Administrative Code and § 27-531(a)(8)(d). The New York City Council first enacted Section 27-531(a)(8)(d) in 1968. However, the 1980çs brought recodification to the Administrative Code, including the protective guardrail provision.

State statutes and municipal ordinances establish negligence differently. Violation of a state statute that imposes a specific duty constitutes negligence per se, while violation of a similar municipal ordinance constitutes only evidence of negligence. The legislature included a provision in the recodified Code stating that the recodification was not to be equated with the enactment of a statute. Therefore, city ordinances incorporated into the Administrative Code are still treated as ordinances. To treat them otherwise, the Court contended, would lead to fragmentation and uncertainty in the application of New York State common law.

Plaintiff cited a line of Court of Appeals cases that held sections of the Administrative Code that impose a specific duty have the "force of statute." Therefore, Plaintiff argued, violations of § 27-531(a)(8)(d) are negligence per se. But the designation "force of statute" only means an ordinance is the controlling authority "'within its sphere of operation,'" and has no bearing on the ordinance's tort consequences. Thus, the trial court erred in finding Defendants' violations of § 27-531(a)(8)(d) constituted negligence per se.


Elliott v. City of New York, 2001 N.Y. Int. 31 (Mar. 27, 2001).


It appears from this case that if the relevant code is a state statute, a violation might equate to negligence, if not, then a violation is merely evidence of neligence, but not conclusive proof of negligence.

If someone has been injured you should certainly contact a lawyer to help you figure out their options.

In Ohio, the Supreme Court answered this question, in layman;s terms as "Not necessarily"

Chief Justice Moyer wrote: "To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

(1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff
(2) the defendant breached that duty, and
(3) the defendant's breach proximately caused the plaintiff to be injured.

"However, this duty does not require landowners to insure the safety of invitees on their property. As we have repeatedly recognized, '[t]he open-and-obvious doctrine remains viable in Ohio. Where a danger is open and obvious, a landowner owes no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the premises.'

... "'[T]he owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves.'

"Thus, when a plaintiff is injured by an open and obvious danger, summary judgment is generally appropriate because the duty of care necessary to establish negligence does not exist as a matter of law."

While a building code violation may be strong evidence that a condition was dangerous and that the landowner breached its duty of care by failing to repair it, the Chief Justice wrote: "(T)he violation is mere evidence of negligence, and does not raise an irrebuttable presumption of it. As is the case with all other methods of proving negligence, the defendant may challenge the plaintiff's case with applicable defenses, such as the open-and-obvious doctrine. The plaintiff can avoid such defenses only with a per se finding of negligence, which we declined to extend to this context in Chambers."

The Chief Justice concluded by noting that property owners who violate the building code face numerous statutory penalties, including injunctions, fines and criminal sanctions, that act as strong disincentives for ignoring their obligation to maintain their property in a safe condition. He observed that today's decision does nothing to reduce the additional deterrent of potential civil damages in cases where courts determine that a code violation that caused injury was not open and obvious.